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Case No. 6216

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
E. J. JEREMY,
Plaintiff and .Appellant,
vs.
ANGEL BERTAGNOLE and LEo M.
BERTAGNOLE,
Defendants and Respondents,
and
~

SuMMIT CouNTY, a municipal ·corporation,
Intervener and Respondent,
and

· MoRGAN CouNTY, a municipal corporation,
Intervener and Resp·ondent.
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF

J

I
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
E. J. JEREMY,
Plaintiff and App,ellant,
~

vs.
ANGEL BERTAGNOLE and LEo M.
BERTAGNOLE,
Defendants and Respondents,
and·

Case No. 6216

SuMMIT CouNTY, a municipal corporation,
Intervener and Respondent,
and
MoRGAN CouNTY, a municipal corporation,
Intervener and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF

Comes now E. J. Jeremy, the plaintiff and appellant
above named, and files this his petition for re-hearing
in the above entitled matter, and for a re-examination
of the record, the same to be considered in connection
with his assignments of error heretofore filed herein
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2.

with the points wherein and hereby it, is
court has erred as follows :

alleged~

the

1. The court has failed to state its "re·asons'' f.or
its d-ecision.

2.

The court has ignored the Assignments of Error.

3. The court has failed to give effect to the burden
of proof.
HARLEY w. ·GUSTIN'
Attorney for PLaintiff
a;nd A ppel~Zarnt.
CERTIFICATE.
The undersigned hereby certifies that he is the -counsel f.or appellant and that in his opinion there is good
reason to believe the judgment herein is ·erroneous and
that the same ought to· be re-examined.
D~TED

this 25th day of September, 1941.
HARLEY W. GusTIN,

Attorney for Plaintiff
. and Apvpellarnt.

·BRIEF OF AuTHORITIES RELIED UPON.

The oour·t has failed to state its ''reasons'' for its
decision.
I

The Constituti~on of the State of Utah, Se·ction 25,
of Article VIII, makes it mandatory for the court to
state its reasons for its decision. ·The section is as
follows:
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'' ''"Yhen a judgment or deeree is reversed,
modified or affir1ned by the Supre1ne C·ourt, the
reasons therefor shall be stated concisely in writing, sig-ned by the judges concurring filed in the
office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and
preserved \Yith a record of -the case. Any judge
dissenting therefrom, may give the reasons of his
dissent in writing ·over his signature.'' (Italics·
ours).
We think it must be conceded that the Constitutional
provision is to be given its ordinary, practical a.nd common sense meaning and that the statement of the reasons
means a statement of the circumstances or proof, fact~
or motives which generate conviction. McKenna v.
White, 192 N. E. 84, (Mass.)
The court has not stated the reasons, a.s so defined,
for the -conclusion that it arrives at. The opinion does
not poin_t out where the :(act of the allege~d abandonment,
dedication or user of the rorad in question is found in the
record, such as would require the forfeiture or loss of
the property right involved, except by sp·eculatiori and
conjecture. With all of the emphasis that we ca~ suggest, and yet with the utmost deference to this learned
court's opinion, we contend that it is not enough for the
court to say that it agrees with our statement of fundamental rules of law and then to S'ay:
''W·e are of the opinion that the evi.dence
supports the findings of the trial court as to user
of the road, that under the law of this jurisdiction the ·court did not err in decreeing .it to be
dedicated as a p:ublic way nor in fixing its width
as by the decree provided. ''
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We are entitled to know and to have the opinion
state the ·evidence that the court says is in the re.cord
that supports the findings of the trial court. The court
says:
''Twenty-eight witnesses were called by defendants who testified to the nature of the road
and to the use thereof which they had observed,
as well as the use whi.ch they had themselves
made of the road. With respect to the use thereof for herding sheep and ·cattle, William Archibald testified that he observed sheep and cattle
using it in the early seventies. He worked out
poll tax on the road £orty years ago. Use of the
road by sheep made worJ:r on the road necessary.''
The expression quoted is the closest approach found
In the opinion to a statement ·of an evidentuary fact.
Does the court intend to hold that Archibald's observation of sheep and eattle using the road in the early
s-eventies justifies a decree that takes private property
for a public use without ~comp·ensati·on ~ Is it controlling
to say that Archibald worked out a poll tax forty years
ago be·cause of debris in the road resulting from the
traffic of livestock~ The sheep and cattle that Archibald
,.says that he saw forty years ago might have been anQ.
probably were the sheep and cattle of the father of
appellant and the predecessor in interest. Archibald's
testimony, we believe, is fairly !abstracted at pages 118119 of our Abstract of the Reco.rd as foll·ows:
''I am ~8 years old and reside in Salt Lake
City. I spent the greatest part of my life in
Summit County at Snyderville. I was well acquainted with the East C~onyan road until about
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the last eighteen years. There was a road there
in 1869 or lrhat you tvould call a trail. If you
got on a bad place, you lU'ould hold the w·agon
up on the one side and get off when you c:ould and
if you didn't tip over and the wagDn w·as on top
of yo·u, you, were all right. I could determine
from the road that ·other wagons had gone up
and down there. I next sa\v the road in 1872.
Around 187 4, I observed little bands of sheep and
cattle coming in from Salt Lake County and using
the road. For many years, I worked for the
state in the Fish and Game D;epartment and had
to do with the planting of fish on East Canyon.
I owned a sawmill at the mouth of Bear Creek.
The lumher was hauled and marketed a.t Park
City, and it went out over the East Canyon road.
There \Yas an old mill at Maxfield's. A man by
the name of Sousta ran sheep down there from
property leased frnm George A. Lowe. This was
in '84 or '86. He used to drive his sheep back
and forth over what is now the Jeremy property.
Around 1895 or '96, I was a County Commissioner
for Summit County. The eounty didn't spend
much money and there was quite a question between Summit County and Morgan County as to
the boundary line. We didn't bother much with
the road, but Morgan County put in a bridge. I
remember work being done ·On the road to pay the
poll tax. This was ·a little over forty years ago.
CROSS EXAMINATION.

We did work on the road to pay the poll tax
and to also help in getting the lumber out. When
the road got slip·pery, a goose couldn't stand on
it if its feet were webbed and the -sheep going
along there had always filled the upper end.
When I refer to the Jeremy ranch, I am referring
to the father of Ethan Jeremy. He and I were
good friends. I do not know whose sheep I saw
there tv hen I was in the country." (Italics ours).
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If the case is to be decided upon the testimony
~f Archibald and treated as the ''reas-on'' why the court
affirmed the decree of the trial .court, then it must be said
that the decision itself is contradictory because the court
says:
''True, such testimony does not reveal that
ap.y witness used the road at weekly, monthly,
or even yearly intervals over a period of ten
years; but from the evidence adduced the inference is ·clearly a reasonable one that the road was
used for the driving of cattle and sheep for a
number of years in excess .o:f that required, wheneve-r it was necessary or convenient for the members of the public who were engaged in raising
or herding stock to so use it.'' (Italics ours).
As hereinabove indicated, the testimony of Archibald
does not show user of the road sufficient in time or. in
law to support the conclusion arrived at. We respectfully request the court to point out the or other
evidence that it says is in the record to substantiate its.
conclusion. A critical analysis of the decision might
easily suggest that Archibald's testimony was the strongest testimony that the court ·Could find and we submit
.that its insufficiency is apparent.
Ap·parently, this court is ·committing itself to a doctrine which l.s wholly incompatible with the protection
of private interests and private property rights. The
court is permitting property to be taken from Mr.
Jeremy by merely inferring an adverse user without
stating what fact or group ·of facts gives rise to the
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inference. W.e suggest that it is not sufficient under
the Constitutional p·rovision to say:
''It \Yonld unduly extend this opinion to set
out the e'-i.dence in support of the finding of the
trail court to this effect (the inference). Suffice
it to say that it \vas sufficient."
The reason why it was sufficient must be stated;
otherwise, \Yhat use is a written decision~ And we
submit that in the decision of the court as it now stands
there is nothing of value .as a precedent. There is nothing stated by way of any analysis of fact that can he
used as a criterion for the proposition that a public
road of the width declared, has been fix·ed hy dedication,
abandonment or user. We ·.are entitled to know the reasons that prompted the court in affirming the trial court's
decision and the logic behind the same.

The court has ignored the Assignm.(3nts of Error.
The assignments all go to the question ·of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment and
decree of the trial court. The situation requires the
court to analyze the entire record. The court says in
effect that Archibald's testimony is not sufficient to support the findings and yet makes no referen-ce to the testimony .of any other witness, except by indirection, if even
that ean be said.
In order that a thing can he inferred or presumed
there must be something to base the inference or p·resumption .upon. The mere fact that twenty-eight wit-
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nesses were called by the defendants and interveners
does not supply the missing link, nor does the number
of witnesses ,justify the court in the indulgence of an
inference. In order that the assignments of .error in
this case be properly ruled upon, the court must, if necessary, extend the opinion sufficient to set out the evidence that supports the findings. To say that ''it would
unduly extend this opinion to set out the evidence in
support .of the finding of the trial court to this effect,''
and then to follow with the comment that: "Suffice it to
say, it was sufficient" is to ignore our assignments of
error and to result in an opinion that is wholly without
value to anyone, and in particular to indicate that justice
has not been meeted out to the parties litigant.

The

decision, as it now stands, means nothing to a person
familiar with or not familiar with the record.
no value as a precedent.

It has

The court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, must pass upon the assignments of error, if the
error is properly assigned. If the assignments of error,
in form, ·do not raise ·a reviewable issue, the court should
so state. If they do raise a reviewable issue, then the
litigants, the bench and the bar in general are entitled
to know that each assignment has been exhaustively
reviewed. In this case, the only way that the assignments of error can be ·exhaustively reviewed, and the
fact indicated, is for the court to p·oint out the evidence
that supports the findings of the trial court.
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The court condenses its idea of appellant's contention as follo"~s:
'• . .\s hereinabove stated, his (the appellant's)
-objection to the judgment below, and the findings
upon which it is based, goes to the use of the
way by any traffic to a greater width than 16 feet
and to any use for the purpose of trailing or
driving sheep or other herds of livestock.''
and the court states its premise in the following language:
'·'It is clear fron1 the evidence tha;t if the finding of the court to the effect that the road had
been continuously used for more than the requisite·
period to esta·hlish dedication for the driving and
trailing of herds of cattle, horses, and especially
sheep along it, the width of five rods fixed by the
_court as the width which is reasonably necessary
for the pu!blic convenience, travel, and use f.or the
purpose for which the public use (have used) the
same is not excessive. We .shall hereafter refer
to the evidence adduced as to the use of the road
for the purpose of driving stock.'' (Italics ours).
T·he court agrees that a. bridle path abandoned to the
public may not be expanded by court decree into a boulevard, but the point is that the court did expand, according to our contention, a bridle path into a boulevard and
we say, with all due respects, that. the trial court did it
without any evidence to justify its action.
This court specifically refers to the trial -court's
finding and in part analyzes the same as follows:
''By its findings of fact the trial eourt found
that the road in question is, and for more than

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
60 years ha.s been, a well traveled, worked, and
defined public. road, the center line of which is by.
the findings particularly described; that said road
forms a part of the public road system of Summit
and Morgan Counties and .of that of the !State of
Utah, connection with State Highway U. S. 305
on the north and with State Highway U. S. 40·5·30 on the south; that it is, and had been for 60
years, continuously used by ranchmen, stockmen,
owners of land contiguous and adjacent thereto,
and by the public generally for all necessary and
convenient purposes, including p~destrian, equestrian, and vehicular traffic, and the driving and
trailing of horses, cattle and sheep ·and herds of
·ea·ch along the sa.me ; and 'that by reason of such
us-e said road has been dedicated and abandoned
t.o the public· as a public road.' ''
The quotation next above is a summary of several individual findings based on the theory respectively of dedication, abandonment and user.

We say that as an

expression of the thing pointed out invoking the jurisdiction of tpis court, the evidence is not sufficient to
support either a dedication, a!bandonment or a user of
the road in question to the width fixed by the trial court.
Even a ca.sual inspection of the road will demonstrate
that the r0;ad has never been· used to the width declared
and that it is physically impossible to lay out, to construct, -or to maintain such a boulevar·d in that mountainous region.

The .count has failed to giv.e effect to the burden of
proof.
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The defendants and interYeners a.tte1npted to justify
tneir position, after conceding that Mr. Jeremy was the
owner of the property, by saying that he had lost a
property right by dedication, abandonment or user. The
defendants ·asserted an affirmative right. The trial ·court
compromised the situation by giving them three rods less
than the eight rods that they asked for. We say that
the defendants and the interveners did not evidence their
contentions by a preponderance of the evidence or by
any evidence.
Our original brief goes into the proposition of the
weight and quantum of evidence required to justify a
taking of private property for a public purpose without
compensation. It is consistently held, as a. fundamental
rule, that property ·Cannot be taken from an individual
for public use without compensation, unless it is shown,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual has
lost his right of enjoyment or possession by some ~act or
negligence of his own. The· importance of an adherence
to these fundamental rules is recognized by the court
and there is no difference !between us on the same.
We do differ, however, ,on the application of those
rules to the ca·se at bar. The "inference" does not satisfy the quantum of proof required. The positive evidence
in the record of a permissive use, either by way of a
gratuity or for compensation, destr·oys the probative
value of any presumption or inference that might otherwise be indulged in. ·The very nature of this appeal and
the ·Controversy presented by the record requires the
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court to point ·out where the evidence justifies the findings and how and in what manner the defendants and
interveners have sustained the burden of proof. The
. reeord does not sho\v a dedication, abandonment or a
use for the required period of time of a five rod road in
f,avor of the public.
The court has misapplied the rule announced in the
eases of Lindsay Lan.d d!i Livestock Co. v. Chu,rnos, 75
Utah 385, 2S5 Pac. 646, and Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah
341, 44 Pac. 1032. These cases involve a factual situation that disclose to the reader of the opinion the propriety of the conclusion arrived a.t by this -court. The
two eases differ in fact but do not differ in the fundamental rules of law relied upon. Upon an analysis of the
two cases, it will be seen that the party litigant asserting the affirm,ative had ample evidence to justify the
reason based upon facts to germinate this court's decision as announced. In each of the eases mentioned,
the court did pr.olong its de-cision by stating the facts
involved, which are wholly different, as a. reading of the
two decisions, will dis·close.
The court does not take into consideration the fact
that the ''public'' does not use Mr. Jeremy's property
for the trailing of sheep; nor does it take in to consideration that the public .at large is not concerned with the
trailing of .sheep. H-ere the Berta.gnoles, being the nearest neighbor to the north, are the only ones that find it
convenient to trail sheep over Mr ..Jeremy's property
rather-than to go a. few miles out of their way and t:Q.us
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traYerse existing sheep trails. The re.eord shows that the
existing sheep trails that would avoid the Jeremy property haYe been used for livestock purposes a.s differentiated from vehicular travel to avoid a trespass upon
private and indiYidually o"Tfled property.

The court in its present decision says in effeet that
the findings o~ the trial court on questions of fact should
be sustained 'vithou_t a review of the evidence to support
the same, if any. The court in effect agrees with our
enunciation of fundamental principles. The whole decision resolves itself into the use of langua.ge in a most
generic way, and leaves the reader of the same to
speculate a.s to why and how the court arrived at its
decision.
it is respe.ctfully prayed that the court
ought to re-examine the cause, together with its decision·,
to the end that this petition for re-hearing be granted.
WHEREFORE,

Respectfully submitted,

W. GusTIN,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.

HARLEY
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